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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We all are aware at this point that we have rapidly advancing technology.  It’s 
advancing faster than it has in previous times, and this creates what Kathy Stone at 
the UCLA School of Law has termed the “boundary-less workplace.”1  So we have 
employees who are working at home and can easily take their offices home with 
them.  What this also means is that we have employees who are doing all kinds of 
personal tasks, beyond what they could have done in previous years, in the 
workplace.   
                                                          
*Assistant Professor, University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law; J.D., 
University of Michigan Law School.  This article is a transcript, with minor changes to ensure 
readability, several asides deleted, and additions to the Conclusion, of The Littler Mendelson 
Employment and Labor Law Lecture at Cleveland–Marshall College of Law presented on 
March 31, 2011.  The author thanks Candice Hoke the title and the opportunity to lecture, 
Daniel Myers, 2010-2011 Submissions Editor for the Cleveland State Law Review for 
transcribing the lecture and Elisabeth Fitzpatrick for her superb research and editorial 
assistance. 
 
1
 Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 66 LA. 
L. REV. 1035, 1037 n.8 (2006). 
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For employers this raises a number of concerns.2  First, employees may be 
spending an inordinate amount of time doing personal tasks in the workplace.3  
Second, some of the tasks they may be doing might be inappropriate for the 
workplace.  They may be looking at child pornography,4 or they may be engaging in 
messaging that can be considered sexual harassment.5  Finally, it is very easy, at the 
push of a button, to put information out to the public.  This might happen 
inadvertently or purposely.  Those who predominantly represent employers can 
probably think of some other difficulties that advancing technology is creating.   
Now, on the flip side, we have some concerns from the employees’ perspective.  
The employers have a much greater ability to monitor employees because of the 
advancing technology6—the technology is a lot more sophisticated than it used to be.  
So there is a greater risk that employers either purposely or inadvertently are 
discovering personal information about employees.  There have also been some 
psychological studies that show when monitoring is engaged in certain ways it can 
cause employees high levels of stress or even physical discomfort.7  Those of you 
who predominantly represent either employees or unions can probably think of some 
other difficulties that your clients are encountering due to this advancing technology.   
In terms of the statistics, there are a number of different studies, but perhaps the 
best one is from the AMA, the American Management Association, because it has 
done this three times.8   The AMA has collected data that is self reported, and it 
tends to be larger companies.9  Maybe smaller companies don’t exactly follow this 
pattern, but our best estimate is that they are close, so these look like fairly good 
statistics.  We can see in 2001 that 77 percent of employers were engaged in 
monitoring.10  This may have increased slightly or decreased slightly, but whatever 
has happened, we know that this is a significant amount of employers—much greater 
than a majority—that are engaging in monitoring of their employees.  We can also 
                                                          
 
2
 See Ariana R. Levinson, What Hath the Twenty First Century Wrought? Issues in the 
Workplace Arising from New Technologies and How Arbitrators Are Dealing with Them, 11 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. OF BUS. L. 9 (2010). 
 
3
 Id. at 16-17. 
 
4
 Id. at 19. 
 
5
 Id. at 19-23. 
 
6
 Id. at 9. 
 
7
 Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-Mail! Employee E-Mail Monitoring and Privacy 
Law in the Age of the “Electronic Sweatshop,” 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 144 (1994).  
 
8
 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey 6, 10 (2008), AMA/EPOLICY INST. 
RESEARCH, AM. MGMT. ASS’N, 
http://www.plattgroupllc.com/jun08/2007ElectronicMonitoringSurveillanceSurvey.pdf; 
Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: The United States Law, 
23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 474 (2002). 
 
9
 Finkin, supra note 8, at 474. 
 
10
 Id. 
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see the great rise in monitoring of computers and electronic files in a ten-year period 
between 1997 and 2007.11   
Finally, we can see some of the newer technologies.  In 2007, twelve percent of 
the reporting employers were monitoring the blogosphere, eight percent were 
monitoring GPS vehicle tracking, and ten percent were monitoring social networking 
sites.12  Probably, some of you are working with social networking policies with the 
companies that you are involved with.  This is a hot topic right now.  Hopefully the 
AMA will do this study again within the next couple years, and we will see whether 
the numbers on monitoring blogs and social networking sites have increased. 
In terms of the technology itself—which I am not a technology expert, I read 
about it and talk to the wonderful IT people that work in my building—there is 
something called a “key logger,” or it is referred to sometimes as a key catcher.13  It 
can either be hardware—it is just that little round thing that hooks where your 
keyboard hooks into your computer14—or it can be software.  If it is software, it 
creates a printout.  It logs every keystroke that the employee is making, so the 
employers can use this to capture the keystrokes that their employees are making and 
have a record of that.15 
Another type of software sold by one company has come up in several of the 
cases that have been litigated.  This company is called SpectorSoft, and it has a 
number of different softwares, but one of its software programs captures everything 
that appears on the computer screen.16  The co-founder of the company made the 
following statements about the software program: “[the program] is designed to 
make it easier for parents to monitor their children’s Internet use and for employers 
to monitor their employees’ Internet use.”17  The software “virtually” 
contemporaneously captures “all instant messages, sent and received e-mails, web 
searches, online chats, file transfers, electronic data and other activity from the 
computer . . . .”18  It is specifically designed for employers to monitor their 
employees’ Internet use, and it captures this information contemporaneously. 
That gives you a picture of what the technology looks like, what the statistics are, 
and what we are grappling with in terms of the law here.  In terms of the law, I am 
going to talk about the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).19  There 
                                                          
 
11
 Compare 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey, supra note 8 (reporting 
43% of employers monitor computer files and e-mail), with Finkin, supra note 8, at 474 
(reporting 13.7% of employers monitor computer files and 14.9% monitor e-mail). 
 
12
 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey, supra note 8. 
 
13
 SEARCHMIDMARKETSECURITY.COM, Definition of Keylogger (Keystroke Logger, Key 
Logger, or System Monitor), 
http://searchmidmarketsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/keylogger (last updated May 2004).  
 
14
 SEARCHMIDMARKETSECURITY.COM, supra note 13.  
 
15
 Id. 
 
16
 Hayes v. Spectorsoft Corp., No. 1:08-CV-187, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102637, at *7 
(E.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2009). 
 
17
 Id. at *6. 
 
18
 Id. at *3. 
 
19
 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
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are also some state statutes that are going to be relevant.  There is the tort that we are 
all very familiar with, dating back to Brandeis’ day, of the invasion of privacy, 
which is invasion of seclusion.20  And then finally we know that right now there is 
the hot topic with the Quon case coming down last term with the Fourth Amendment 
and public-sector employers and employees.21   
Before I jump into the law, try to think about an employer’s perspective and an 
employee’s perspective on these issues.  Even if you don’t predominantly represent 
employers or employees, you are probably an employee or, perhaps, an employer 
yourself; maybe you work for a company. So, everybody  has perspective on these 
issues.  
If you are thinking about this from the employer’s perspective as you are 
thinking about this law, try and ask yourself some questions: Is there some sort of 
safe harbor here?  If the employer is trying to protect employees’ privacy and also 
meet the necessary needs to make sure that the company is running lawfully and 
efficiently, is there some type of policy or action that the employer can take to be 
protected legally?  Is there any uniformity here?  Is it such that the employer knows 
what it should do and whether it can do this in all jurisdictions, or does the employer 
have to grapple with different laws and different jurisdictions?  You can ask 
yourself: is this overly technical?  Is it difficult to understand?  Is an employer going 
to have to go out and hire an attorney to be able to grapple with these laws?  
From the employee’s perspective, you can ask yourself: is there some type of 
minimal level of protection for privacy here?  Is there any baseline protection for 
employees’ privacy in the workplace?  Is this clear for employees?  Can they tell that 
they may be doing something that the employer should or could investigate, or when 
they are doing something that the employer shouldn’t or couldn’t investigate?  And 
finally, is there any remedy if an employee feels that privacy has been invaded?  
II.  ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT 
First, we have the ECPA.22  A lot of the courts and the scholars have indicated 
that it is very technical, difficult to interpret, and one of the most difficult acts out 
there.23  Having spent the last year and a half looking at it, I throw my weight behind 
this sentiment.  It is very technical and I’m going to give you a simplified view—I’m 
just going to give you the nutshell view so you can have some baseline 
understanding of what’s involved with the ECPA.   
                                                          
 
20
 See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Rhodes v. Graham, 37 
S.W.2d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 1931); White v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt. 118 A. 77 (Md. 
1922); Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 269 N.W. 295 (Wis. 1936). 
 
21
 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
 
22
 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 
23
 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994); 
Connie Barba, ‘That’s No ‘Beep’, That’s My Boss:’ Congress Seeks to Disconnect the Secrecy 
of Telephone Monitoring in the Workplace, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 881, 883 n.17 (1988); 
Jeremy E. Gruber & Lewis Maltby, The Need for Reasonable Policies, [213-FEB.] N.J. LAW. 
41, 43 (2002); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004); Meir S. 
Hornung, Note, Think Before You Type: A Look at Email Privacy in the Workplace, 11 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 115, 130 (2005). 
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The ECPA has three titles.24  We are curious about two of the titles because they 
relate to when employers monitor their employees’ electronic communications.  Title 
I is commonly known as the Wiretap Act.25  If there is anyone with criminal-law 
experience, you may have come across the ECPA in that context.  The Wiretap Act 
prohibits the intentional acquisition of the contents of electronic communications, 
which is the interception of electronic communications.26  The Stored 
Communications Act, Title II, prohibits the intentional unauthorized access to stored 
communications.27  So we have one title, on the one hand, that is dealing with 
interception and the other one is dealing with stored communications.  The 
distinction matters because the Wiretap Act is considered to be more restrictive in 
terms of what employers and others can do when they are monitoring.28  Also, in 
certain circuits like the Fourth Circuit, the damages are more limited under the 
Stored Communications Act,29 so again the Wiretap Act is considered to provide 
broader protections to employees.  And then finally there are some disclosure 
provisions in the Wiretap Act30 that I am not going to go into, but for that reason it 
could also be considered more protective of employee privacy. 
A.  Wiretap Act 
So we start with the Wiretap Act, and you will see all these issues listed out in 
front of you,31 all of them open issues, and for both of these Acts we will have court 
cases on every open issue that reach opposite results, sometimes diametrically 
opposed results, on very similar facts.  I will not go into all of them, but I will 
provide some examples.   
1.  Interception 
The first thing that comes up with the Wiretap Act is what is “interception.”  At 
the time that the ECPA was passed, it was the 1980s and the technology looked very 
different at that time.  If you were intercepting a wire communication, you got it in 
transit—it was not stored, and it was being passed from the sender to the receiver.  
When you flash forward to today, you have all kinds of electronic communications 
like email and text messages that pass from sender to receiver in under a second.  
                                                          
 
24
 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 
25
 Nathaniel Gleicher, Neither a Customer Nor a Subscriber Be: Regulating the Release of 
User Information on the World Wide Web, 118 YALE L.J. 1945, 1946 (2009). 
 
26
 Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 39 (2011). 
 
27
 Gleicher, supra note 25. 
 
28
 Robert A. Pikowsky, Privilege and Confidentiality of Attorney-Client Communication 
Via Email, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 483, 553 (1999). 
 
29
 Van Alstyne v. Elec. Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 
30
 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)-(d) (2006 & Supp. 2008). 
 
31
 See id. The issues are (1) interception; (2) consent; (3) provider; (4) ordinary course of 
business; and, (5) interstate commerce. 
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And during most of the time that they are passing from sender to receiver, they are 
stored.  They are not un-stored and in transit, but stored and in transit.32 
So the issues are: does “interception” include acquiring stored communications?  
And does the communication need to be in transit?  From the earliest cases, what the 
courts said was that it needs to be in transit and that it cannot be stored.33  For 
instance, we have the Bohach34 case.  What happened in this case was that there was 
a paging system, and an employee could send text messages through the paging 
system.35  The employee could do this in one of three ways:36 through the actual 
paging device; over a telephone line; or on the employer’s computer.37  The case 
arose because of messages that were sent on the employer’s computer.38  The 
employee would type the message onto the employer’s computer.  It would then go 
off to the paging company.  The paging company would send it on to the recipient.39  
The employer was engaging in an internal investigation and decided to read the 
employees’ messages that were logged on the computer.40  So the question was 
whether these messages were “intercepted” when the computer acquired and stored 
them.41  The court said no.42  The court reasoned it was not an interception because 
the employer was dealing with stored communications, and a stored communication 
cannot be intercepted.43  It is not like a hidden microphone picking up what we are 
conversing about.44  It is not like a wiretap on a phone line; it is stored 
communication.  That was the traditional view. 
More recently courts have been more willing to recognize that the technology 
involves storing information while it is in transit.  They are willing to recognize that 
information can be stored and still intercepted.  They still, however, want it to be 
during transmission to constitute an interception.  In Global Policy Partners, a 2009 
case,45 for instance, there was a husband and wife team—these cases all make for 
interesting facts—and they were working in a company, and then they decided to 
                                                          
 
32
 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
 
33
 See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994); 
Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).  
 
34
 Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1232. 
 
35
 Id. at 1233-34. 
 
36
 Id. at 1234. 
 
37
 Id. 
 
38
 Id. at 1233. 
 
39
 Id. at 1234. 
 
40
 Id. at 1233. 
 
41
 Id. at 1236. 
 
42
 Id. 
 
43
 Id. 1236-37. 
 
44
 Id. at 1236. 
 
45
 Global Policy Partners, LLC v. Yessin, 686 F. Supp. 2d 631 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
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separate and divorce.46   The husband obtained the password to the wife’s email 
communications, and, in particular, he went into her business email account and read 
all of the messages her divorce attorney had sent to her.47  The first question that 
arises, if she wants to sue under the Wiretap Act, which she does, is whether this is 
an “interception.”48  This is what the court tells us—we have a football analogy:  
Thus, interception includes accessing messages in transient storage on a 
server during the course of transmission, but does not include accessing 
the messages stored on a destination server.  In other words, these statutes 
give “intercept” its common meaning, which is perhaps best understood 
through a football analogy. In American football, a ball can only be 
intercepted when it is “in flight.” Once a pass receiver on the offensive 
team has caught the ball, the window for interception has closed, and 
defenders can only hope to force a fumble. In essentially the same way, a 
qualifying “intercept” under the ECPA . . . can only occur where an e-
mail communication is accessed at some point between the time the 
communication is sent and the time it is received by the destination server 
. . .
49
 
Notice the court says this has reached the destination server, regardless of 
whether she read the messages or not, and some of them she has not read, so she had 
not received.50  This will not constitute an intercept.51 
Then we have the third approach, which is that taken in Shefts,52 and this 
approach is the one that the federal district courts in Illinois and the Seventh Circuit 
courts are using.  What happens in Shefts is there is an employee, and he is using a 
Blackberry, and allegedly he is sexually harassing other employees and breaching 
his fiduciary duties.53  The employer decides that it needs to investigate whether 
these allegations are true.  One of the ways that it investigates is it has IT convert the 
software on the computer so that all of the suspected employee’s text messages on 
his Blackberry are captured onto the computer.54  So the first issue is, when the 
computer captures those text messages, is it intercepting them when it acquires the 
messages?  The Shefts court says yes.55  The court reasons that it is an interception 
when the computer acquires those messages.56  So we have three different 
approaches to this question of what constitutes an “interception.” 
                                                          
 
46
 Id. at 633. 
 
47
 Id. at 634. 
 
48
 Id. at 637. 
 
49
 Id. at 638 (citations omitted). 
 
50
 Id. at 639. 
 
51
 Id. 
 
52
 Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620 (C.D. Ill. 2010). 
 
53
 Id. at 625. 
 
54
 Id. at 625-26. 
 
55
 Id. at 630. 
 
56
 Id. 
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2.  Exceptions 
Once you have an interception—you have determined an employer has 
intercepted somebody’s electronic communications—you check whether the 
employer fits into any of the exceptions, and remember there are three.  They are 
consent, ordinary course of business, and provider.57  In terms of consent, there are a 
lot of cases from telephone issues and pre-electronic communication, which provide 
a long history of what consent means.58  It is very explicit in the legislative history 
that this is implied-in-fact consent. You have to look at the facts,59 consider the 
totality of the circumstances, and determine if the person knew he or she was being 
monitored and whether the person assented.  The person doesn’t actually have to say 
“I consent to you monitoring,” but the person needs to know the person is being 
monitored and go ahead and engage in the conduct in the face of that knowledge.60  
Consent is important because it is what encourages employers to have policies.  
Policies encourage deliberate thinking on the part of employers and give employees 
the opportunity to change their behavior.61  That makes the consent exception an 
important one. 
The ordinary course of business exception is a little trickier.  It only applies when 
you are using telephone and telegraph equipment generally.62  The Second Circuit 
has ruled otherwise though.63  It applies it to electronic communications regardless of 
whether there is telephone or telegraph equipment involved.64  But if you fall into the 
circumstance like a Blackberry or a cell phone that is telephone equipment and 
contains electronic communications, then there are further requirements.  These 
cases are all over the map.  In some jurisdictions, if you have a legitimate business 
reason and you are an employer, then you are acting in the ordinary course of 
business.65  In other jurisdictions, you need not only a legitimate business reason, but 
it needs to be a routine practice—a practice that the business ordinarily engages in.66  
The Sixth Circuit requires a legitimate business reason, that it be in the ordinary 
                                                          
 
57
 Ariana R. Levinson, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act for the Electronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011). 
 
58
 See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Petti, 973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Splawn, 982 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Carrazana, 921 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1991); Shubert v. Metrophone, Inc., 898 
F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
59
 Levinson, supra note 57, at 34. 
 
60
 See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2003); Adams v. City of Battle 
Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 992 (6th Cir. 2001); Potter v. Havlicek, No. 3:06-CV-211, 2007 WL 
539534, at *8 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
 
61
 Levinson, supra note 57, at 34. 
 
62
 Id. at 38. 
 
63
 Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 
64
 Id. 
 
65
 Arias v. Mutual Cent. Alarm Servs., Inc., 182 F.R.D. 407, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 
66
 Briggs v. Am. Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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course of things, a routine practice, and notice.67  So that circuit is the most 
stringently restrictive in terms of the ordinary course of business exception.   
The courts are also all over the map on if an employer is listening to personal 
conversations, or in this context knows that an electronic communication is personal, 
it should stop monitoring at that point.  There are some courts that don’t care; if you 
have a legitimate business reason, you can monitor personal information.68  Others 
say you should stop monitoring when you hear “hi, honey” on the telephone.69   
The third exception is the provider exception.    
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for . . . an officer, employee, or 
agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose 
facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic 
communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the 
normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a 
necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of 
rights or property of the provider of that service . . . 70 
Just looking at the face of this exception, what does it require?  It requires some type 
of agent of the provider; it requires that the agent be engaged in the ordinary course 
of employment; it requires that the agent be acting as a necessary incident to protect 
the rights or property of the provider, or because the agent is an IT person, and it is 
part of the job requirements.71  So we have courts that have interpreted this more or 
less broadly.   
Specifically, this language, “rights or property” of the employer, has been 
interpreted more or less broadly.  There is the Kinesis case, which comes from North 
Carolina.72  In this case, there was an employee who left and had breached, or 
allegedly breached, a covenant not to compete.73  When the employee left, the 
employer went back through the business email of that employee to look for 
evidence of the breach of the covenant not to compete.74  The court said “yes,” that is 
protection of the employer’s rights and property.75  So, that employer acted lawfully 
and did not violate the Wiretap Act.76   
And then with an even broader interpretation of this language, we have Freedom 
Calls.77  Here, the employee was terminated, and the employer went back again into 
                                                          
 
67
 Adams v. Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 
68
 Amati v. Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 
69
 See Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 
70
 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006 & Supp. 2008). 
 
71
 Id.  
 
72
 Kinesis Adver., Inc. v. Hill, 652 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
 
73
 Id. at 289. 
 
74
 Id. at 296. 
 
75
 Id. 
 
76
 Id. 
 
77
 Freedom Calls Found. v. Bukstel, No. 05CV5460(SJ)(VVP), 2006 WL 845509, at *27 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2006). 
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the business email and responded to the messages that were coming in using the 
employee’s email account on the employer’s business email.78  The court here took 
an even broader approach.  The court said “yes,” the employer was the provider.79  
The court reasoned that the employer needed to timely respond to messages and 
needed to make sure that the business acted efficiently, so this falls within the 
protection of the rights or property of the employer.80   
But there is an interesting California case, O’Grady,81 and it is not about this 
provider exception but a provider exception with exactly the same language in the 
Stored Communications Act, and it applies to the disclosure provisions there.82  But 
what is interesting is that the court drew a very firm line saying that “rights or 
property” does not mean any cost to the employer.83  This needs to be somehow 
restricted to rights and property that relate to the employer’s responsibility as a 
service provider because most employers are not service providers. 84  They act as 
service providers, but they also have some other primary business that they are 
engaged in.  So you see those cases interpreting the language of the provider 
exception come out differently, 
That is the Wiretap Act.  You want to ask yourself whether it is an interception, 
and, if so, whether the employer falls within one of the exceptions.   
B.  Stored Communications Act 
Then we get to the Stored Communications Act.85  It is exactly the same—it is 
really complicated; it has all these issues (you can see them listed86); and the courts 
have gone every which way again on all of them.   
1.  Electronic Storage 
The first question we encounter here is: what is a stored communication?  The 
Act prohibits unauthorized access to stored communications.87  This is the definition 
of electronic storage:  
(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) 
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any storage of such communication by an electronic communication 
service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.88  
Most courts have said this is very broad.89  If an ISP provider has the electronic 
communication, it is a stored communication.  But not all of them.   
One good example of a court interpreting the language broadly is the Fischer 
case.90  In this case, a church was the employer of a youth pastor.91  The youth 
pastor’s obligations were to counsel youth but also periodically adults.92  Somebody 
thought that they overheard a sexual conversation between the youth pastor and 
another male adult.93  The employer was concerned about this and decided to 
investigate.  The employer hired an expert.94  The expert went onto the work 
computer and guessed at what the Hotmail account password of the employee was.95  
The employee had apparently not been using the Hotmail account to work and had 
not established the account at work, and it was a private, personal account.96  The 
employer went into the account, read the messages, and printed some of them out.97  
The first question is: were those stored communications?  The court said yes.98  The 
court reasoned the messages were there on the hotmail server, they were stored there, 
and that was a stored communication.99   
But there are other courts, and these are in the minority, which have said “no,” 
the term “electronic storage” is not that broad.  In particular, there is an interesting 
case—the Flagg decision.100  The Flagg decision is out of the Eastern District of 
Michigan, and it has complicated facts.  What it boils down to is whether messages 
created by employees of a city were in electronic storage.101  The city had a text 
messaging service, and it stopped using it.102   But the service continued to retain 
copies of those messages.103  The question was: were those stored?  The court said 
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no.104  The court reasoned that the copy retained by the service was the only copy, 
and that the only copy cannot be a backup copy.105  So the court held the messages 
were not stored.  And you will see other cases going both ways.106 
2.  Exceptions 
There are two exceptions.  We are not going to go into “Without Authorization.”  
It has a lot of case law.107  Assuming the electronic communication is stored, and you 
accessed it without authorization, then you come to two exceptions—the provider 
exception and the user exception.  They are both authorization exceptions. 
The provider exception looks like this:  “Subsection (a) of this section does not 
apply with respect to conduct authorized (1) by the person or entity providing a wire 
or electronic communications service.”108  Notice how much more broad it is than 
the provider exception seen in the Wiretap Act. Almost anytime an employer is 
providing the electronic communication service, and it is stored communications, the 
employer will be able to access them under this provider exception.109  Now, if it is a 
third-party provider then that is different, like with the text messaging companies.110  
That gets into the distinction between electronic communications services and 
remote computing services.  Those won’t be discussed, but that distinction 
determines, when dealing with a third-party provider, whether the third-party 
provider can release the electronic communication to the employer or not.111   
The exception that has some interesting cases is the “user authorization” 
exception.   It is interesting because you have, under the Stored Communications 
Act, a very broad provider exception, but the user exception is perhaps the exception 
that has been most restrictively interpreted by the courts.  So it is very hard then to 
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get user authorization.  One interesting case is Pure Power Boot Camp.112  This 
employee did something we should never do.  He left this company and set up a 
competing fitness center, but on the employee’s old work computer, he had accessed 
his Hotmail and Gmail accounts.113  When he accessed his Hotmail account, he used 
the “remember my password” function.114  Don’t use that function.  He left the 
password there on his employer’s computer.  And when he left and established his 
new business, the employer went right on there, got the password, and went right 
into his personal email account.115  The employer had a policy, and this is what the 
policy said: “[E]-mail users have no right of personal privacy in any matter stored in, 
created on, received from, or sent through or over the system. This includes the use 
of personal e-mail accounts on Company equipment.”116  It looks pretty broad, right?  
You would think that it authorized the employer to go on and get the password that 
the employee inadvertently stored on the employer’s computer.   But the court said 
“no,” this was not authorized by the user.117  The analogy that the court used was if 
the user leaves a key at the front desk to the user’s house, with the receptionist, does 
that authorize the management to take the key, go to the house, and rummage 
through the employee’s belongings?118  The court reasoned that even in the face of 
this policy, that is not user authorization.119 
The other issue that comes up in these user authorization cases is illustrated by 
Pietrylo.120  What happened here is that employees were using a chat group.121  The 
case does not reflect what was on there, but I imagine it was disparaging of the 
employer.  They were using the chat group, and one of the managers asked one of 
the employees to give the password to the manager, and the employee did.122  But the 
court found that was not user authorization because the employee felt pressured to 
give the manager the password.123  The employee felt that if she hadn’t given it to the 
manager, there would have been negative consequences.124  So again, that was not 
found to be user authorization. 
That is the ECPA in a nutshell.  Try to simplify it, and think about how 
understandable these laws are.   
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III.  STATE LAWS 
Once you have tried to figure out your rights as an employer or as an employee 
under the ECPA, then you need to look at your specific state law.  Most states have 
some kind of mini-ECPA, and in some of them there is a two-party consent 
requirement, so it is not enough that one party consents.  I looked up Ohio, and it 
does not seem to have two-party consent, which is like the ECPA.125  But there are 
other states that have different kinds of provisions that will come into play here, so 
employers need to be aware of them, as do employees in these particular states.   
Many states have minimum privacy levels: New York and Rhode Island are just 
examples.  These are laws that protect employees’ privacy in places, like restrooms, 
that most of us can agree that employees would be entitled to some type of privacy 
in.  They differ by state, so you can see New York prohibits two-way mirrors, video 
in the restroom, and video in the locker and changing rooms.126  Whereas Rhode 
Island just prohibits video or audio in the restroom.127   
There are also a couple of states, Connecticut128 and Delaware,129 that have notice 
laws.  These are modeled on the NEMA—Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act—
that failed to pass around 2000.130   It was a proposed federal statute.  These are 
based on that same concept, most likely,131 that employers are more reflective when 
they need to provide notice.  They think more about how to monitor.  And 
employees have the opportunity to change their behavior.  There are differences 
again between the two states.  The Connecticut statute is really broad.  You need to 
give notice of any kind of monitoring that is not direct observation.132  The Delaware 
statute is more limited.  It covers monitoring of telephone, internet, and email.133  
Connecticut requires written notice.134  In Delaware, it is okay to have something 
that pops up on the screen when the employee logs in as the form of notice that is 
provided.135  Connecticut has a labor commissioner proceeding.136  In Delaware, you 
file individual suit.137  So as you are thinking about ideally what would work here, 
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these state statutes are a good laboratory for looking at what would be a good 
balance of employers’ and employees’ interests. 
In Michigan and in Illinois, there are acts that govern the integrity of personnel 
records.138  Again these are not specifically geared towards electronic monitoring, 
but what they prohibit is gathering information about people’s non-employment 
related communication.139  And of course if the employee authorizes this, it is all 
right in both of these states, but, in that instance, an employer would need to have a 
record of what was gathered, and the employee has a right to review the 
information.140  So there are differences again.  There are exemptions for when an 
employee is engaging in criminal activity, and the notice that has to be given in 
Michigan in that situation is different than in Illinois, where you only give notice if 
you take adverse action based on the criminal investigation.141  Michigan has a 
lawsuit; Illinois has the Department of Labor.142  Illinois includes anti-retaliation 
provisions and provisions that give union representatives the right to review 
information.143 
These are interesting statutes—lawful off-duty activity statutes.  Several scholars 
have written about them.144  You may have heard them referred to as lifestyle 
discrimination statutes.  The goal of these statutes is that if an employee is engaging 
in lawful conduct off duty, then they should not suffer adverse consequences at 
work.  Again, though, there are differences between the coverage of them.  In North 
Dakota and New York, the prohibition is pretty broad—any type of adverse action.145  
In Colorado, it is just prohibiting termination because of lawful off-duty conduct.146  
In North Dakota, the coverage is broad; it is any type of lawful off-duty conduct.147  
In New York, it is very restrictive, so the category that applies here is recreational 
activities.  If you are on Facebook, blogging, in a chat room, or engaged in some sort 
of recreational activity, it might fall within the protections of the New York statute.  
The exceptions in the enforcement provisions vary.   
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That gives us the fact that we want to look at the ECPA, we want to look at the 
state statutes, and then of course we want to look at the invasion of privacy tort. 
IV.  TORT INVASION OF PRIVACY 
In terms of invasion of privacy, we are all familiar with the tort of intrusion on 
seclusion.  While it varies from state to state, the tort generally requires, first of all, 
that you have some reasonable expectation of privacy.148  This needs to be 
subjectively, but more importantly, objectively reasonable.149  There needs to be an 
intrusion on that expectation of privacy, and it should be highly offensive.150  And 
that is objective.  So the intrusion must be highly offensive in an objective way.  
This quotation is from Smyth, which is considered to be the seminal case in this area: 
[W]e do not find a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail 
communications voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over 
the company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such 
communications would not be intercepted by management.  Once plaintiff 
communicated the alleged unprofessional comments to a second person 
(his supervisor) over an e-mail system which was apparently utilized by 
the entire company, any reasonable expectation of privacy was lost. 
Significantly, the defendant did not require plaintiff, as in the case of a 
urinalysis or personal property search to disclose any personal 
information about himself.  Rather, plaintiff voluntarily communicated 
the alleged unprofessional comments over the company e-mail system. 
We find no privacy interests in such communications.151 
What happens here is that an employee uses profanity in communicating with his 
supervisor, and makes some really inappropriate remarks.152  But he has been told by 
management that none of the conversations and communications via the email 
system will be monitored.153  Yet, lo and behold, there must have been reports of him 
making inappropriate comments because the managers decided to monitor, and they 
found these communications.154  The court found that the employee had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, despite the specific disclaimer that he would not 
be monitored.155  As you see, significantly, this is not like a urinalysis or a search of 
personal property.156  The court also went on to say that even if the employee had 
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some reasonable expectation of privacy, it is not highly offensive for an employer to 
investigate inappropriate comments in the workplace.157 
Nevertheless, at the same time, you will see the Restuccia case that came down 
around the same time.158  This court said there could be a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.159  There was an employer policy that said employees should not engage in 
excessive chat on the business email, but they could use it for personal 
communications.160  The employee was accused of excessive quantity of email.  The 
employee had been told that he could use the business email for personal 
communications; he had his own password, and he did not know supervisors could 
look at the emails.161  But it turned out that supervisors could take another password 
and go on and look at it, and look at everything that had been stored on the server.162  
The court reasoned that there could be a reasonable expectation of privacy in those 
circumstances.163  It was just denying summary judgment.164  The court also said that 
the monitoring could be an “unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with 
plaintiffs’ privacy,”165 a similar requirement to that of the highly offensive 
requirement in most jurisdictions. 
Then we have Fischer, the case previously discussed about stored 
communications with the youth pastor, who also brought an invasion of privacy 
claim.166  The court said, again on summary judgment, that “yes,” perhaps his 
Hotmail account was entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy, and that it may 
have been highly offensive for his employer to go onto his personal account and read 
his emails.167 
Then there is the case Thygeson.168  It comes to the opposite result of Fischer; it 
is consistent with Smyth.  This is the case where an employee had nudity and 
sexually inappropriate jokes saved onto the computer.169  He would go onto his 
personal email at work and download these things onto the computer and put them in 
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a file marked “personal.”170  This court said that if you mark your file personal, but 
you do not restrict it with a password, you have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in that file.171  The employer also investigated the Internet hits, not the content, just 
the pages the employee had hit, and the court again said there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in what Internet sites an employee hits.172  The court went on 
to find it would not be highly offensive.  
I am still discussing the tort, and skipping to a different kind of observation.  
These cases come up all the time because of disability and workers’ compensation 
claims.  What happens in this case, I.C.U. Investigations, Inc.,173 is that you have an 
employee, and he obtained a $100,000 judgment for invasion of his privacy because 
he had been injured.174  The employer decided to investigate.175  The employer hired 
I.C.U. to investigate the employee for 11 or 12 days.176  The employee lived on a 41 
acre yard,177 but his yard was visible from a highway, and the I.C.U. investigators 
parked their car at the strip of the highway and videotaped what the employee was 
doing in the yard.178  In particular, they videotaped him urinating four times in his 
yard.179 So he obtained a $100,000 judgment,180 but, nevertheless, the Alabama 
Supreme Court was not impressed with the $100,000 judgment.  The court reasoned 
that he was out in his yard, and that was visible to the public, and so he had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his yard.181  There were dissents.182   
There are similar Ohio cases.183  They are not as interesting in the facts, but the 
bottom line would be that employers do not observe people in their homes, but an 
employee has no reasonable expectation of privacy in what the employee is doing in 
the yard that is visible to an employer.184 
The Restatement of Employment is coming out.185  It is a useful resource; it is 
going to have lots of areas and I suggest following its development.  One of the areas 
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it is going to have is privacy.  It is not out yet, but it is something that you want to 
look toward being aware of. 
V.  FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Finally, we get to the Fourth Amendment—the moment we all have been waiting 
for, because the Fourth Amendment discussion involves Quon.186  But it only applies 
in the public sector,187 and that is why I save it for last.  It is an additional thing that 
you need to be aware of if you are an employer or an employee in the public sector.  
We are probably all familiar with O’Connor v. Ortega188 which is the backdrop to 
Quon.  I’ll just refresh your memory briefly on the case.  Basically, you had a doctor, 
and he was placed on administrative leave.189  The employer searched his office, his 
desk, and his file cabinets.190  The Court could not reach a consensus, so it was a 
plurality opinion.191  Justice O’Connor wrote the decision,192 and the test that she 
adopted was a two-part test.193  You look first at whether there was a reasonable 
expectation of privacy,194 and second at whether the employer had violated it.195  
Scalia disagreed in his concurrence.196  He does not like that test.  He said there is 
always a reasonable expectation of privacy, just jump straight to the second part.197   
We hoped that in Quon we might get some clarification, but there is none.  So the 
first thing you need to ask if you have one of these cases is what test and what result 
under either of these tests.  As to whether you have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, Quon was a situation where a SWAT Team officer was involved in some 
tryst, sending text messages of a sexual nature.198  The employer decided to 
investigate because it thought that there was an overage every month, and there had 
been too much use of the equipment, and maybe it needed to raise the amount of 
messages that employees could send out.199  The Court punted.  The Court said it 
would not decide whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in those 
workplace electronic communications.200   
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What the Court did address was whether the intrusion was reasonable.201  It said 
it was reasonable at the inception.202  It is reasonable to look at text messages to 
determine how many text messages should be allotted to a person each month.203  It 
said that the scope of the investigation was also reasonable.204  The employees were 
on a SWAT Team; they should have known that their messages might be 
discoverable.205  That was one thing.  The employer also took precautions.  The 
managers looked at only two months’ worth, not four or five months’ worth, of 
messages.206  And when they got to the point of the internal investigation, they 
redacted all messages sent outside of work hours.207  You can think of slightly 
different facts that would change the outcome, so we don’t know—there are a lot of 
open questions there.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Finally, to wrap up, what might be done?  There are a lot of laws here, but what 
might be done?   
There is the possibility of federal legislation.  There are a lot of people pushing 
for a federal privacy law.  A broad coalition of groups, including Microsoft and the 
Center for Democracy and Technology, are pushing for a European style data-
protection law.208  The proposed Boucher Bill is such legislation,209 although it does 
not focus on employment.210  Some have called for a sectoral approach,211 which 
could include a federal law aimed at privacy issues raised in the employment sector.  
If you predominately represent employers, and are concerned about differing rules 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, you can get involved with promoting preemptive 
federal legislation.  And, if you predominately represent employees and desire 
European-style minimum rights, then you can get involved with promoting a federal 
data-protection law.  Whomever you represent, you can figure out whether you 
prefer an omnibus or sectoral approach to federal legislation. 
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There is also the possibility of state legislation.  Much like there was tort reform 
with workers’ compensation, the possibility exists that there could be some 
consensus among the constituencies in a particular state.  The states with notice laws, 
off-duty activity laws, and laws governing the integrity of personnel records might 
be models to consider for those in other states. 
As to what might be done on a more case-by-case basis, there is a lot of activity 
in terms of the union setting with collective-bargaining agreements.  I actually spend 
a lot of time studying arbitration and reading labor arbitration opinions and awards.  
Interestingly, the labor arbitrators are grappling with a lot of these privacy issues.212  
These issues come up when an employee is terminated, arguably in violation of a 
just cause provision or when a union bargains over a policy that impacts employer 
electronic monitoring.  So, one idea, if you represent unions or employers in the 
unionized sector, is that they can bargain for certain policies or use arbitration as a 
way to develop a coherent agreement about these monitoring and privacy issues. 
Even in the non-union sector, there are employer-promulgated policies, which 
are important.  We have seen that these policies are encouraged by the ECPA 
because of the consent and user authorization exceptions.  And these policies can 
impact whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic 
communications sent while at work or using an employer’s equipment.  It is a good 
idea for those who predominately represent employers to encourage review of these 
policies.  They should be reviewed not only in light of these laws, but also in light of 
the psychological literature about whether monitoring is appropriate for a particular 
workforce, and, if so, how it should be carried out.213 
Finally, in terms of education, I encourage you to join the ABA Labor and 
Employment Law Section that has a committee on technology in the workplace.  
They do great work around these issues.214  And, of course, there are many other 
organizations in which you can become involved.  The American Civil Liberties 
Union has been active in privacy for employees for a long time.215  The Future of 
Privacy Forum,216 which is a think tank in D.C., is involved in the Boucher 
legislation.  I encourage you to talk to your friends and colleagues.  People do not 
realize that they are susceptible to monitoring or that information is not private.  
Employers do not realize there are all these laws they could run afoul of.   
So consider a glass, and the question is: is it half empty or half full?  If you have 
been thinking through the questions that were posed, you might say it is half empty.  
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There are all these different protections; employers don’t know what to apply; they 
don’t know what safe harbor is.  Employees cannot tell if there is some type of 
minimal right.  Or you might say it is half full.  You might think “there is a lot more 
here than I thought before I stepped in the room today that is applicable in this 
setting.”  And perhaps both are true. Thank you for your time.   
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